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school, may be said to differ in many points, "il est impossible que tous les esprits prennent la même direction; leur marche dif-

fère comme le vol des oiseaux";—yet all lift their souls nearer to heaven, and worship immortal HARMONY!

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER X.

THE UNIVERSAL.

Those who know of no other universal than that obtained by abstracting differences, and seizing the common marks of objects, have no philosophical conception of the universal. It is to be regretted that in the English language the word "general," which is the best word for the purpose, has sunk into a synonym of "common," and has a merely discursive use. From its root, GEN, we could expect a suggestiveness in it of the creative significance of the "universal." In such words as *genius*, *generous*, *genial*, we have the meaning referred to, and *general* was used by the spirit of our language (*Sprach-Geist*) to express the true idea of that which is "all-common" and at the same time the creative essence. In German we have *Allgemein* and *Gattung* to express the two meanings.

In this chapter we hope to make clear how the *common* and *creative* have the same root, and to show in what sense the Universal or Generic may be said to be the only true existence.

THE PARTICULAR.

Seize upon the world of reality as it offers itself and it breaks up into an infinite course of individuals,—side by side in space and succeeding each other in time. Each one seems to be peculiar and distinct from all the rest, and it is as impossible for us to find any two objects exactly alike as it was for the ladies of the Court at which Leibnitz resided, to find any two leaves of the forest exactly alike, though they searched with care. If we look upon each object as absolutely determined, fixed in its being, and at the same time attribute to it independent validity and real existence,—this is the "common sense" view, and is held by those who are most opposed to idealism. Over against the particular it holds the *common* or *general*.

Experience is always engaged in discovering resemblances. What is *common* to *different* objects is funded, and the process called generalization. The common or general element is looked upon as more or less accidental or contingent; perhaps even regarded as subjective, and a mere reflection, made by the spectator.

Words stand for the common elements, and, the differences being abstracted, of course it follows that the general concepts for which words stand correspond to nothing real, but are merely figments of the mind, and are either arbitrary or the product of mental laws.

Such, in substance, is the view of those who never rise above the stages of sense and reflection. But in reflection arises a side which results finally in overthrowing this view;—it is the *dynamic* view, wherein all is treated as

THE RELATIVE.

If we seize the particular, and demand of it what it is that gives it distinctness or separation from others, we are at once engaged in noting its complication with other particulars. We find that what constitutes it a *particular individual* is to be stated as a series of defects and potentialities which manifest themselves as we pursue our investigation. (See Chap. VIII., 1.) Through these lacks or wants or deficiencies it is related to and dependent upon an outlying sphere of existence, which needs to be added to it to complete it. The particular, in short, exhibits its whole series of phases as a tendency to lose its distinguishing characteristics in attaining to a complete realization of the entire compass of its existence. That which is partial is so far forth affected with a mortal malady, and the wholeness of its universality is the healthy (whole-some) state which it needs.

The particular can only be seized by transcending it. Its own existence, too, is a self-transcending, for it has its *properties*

through its relation to the Beyond. It is therefore only in the total compass or sphere that includes it, as a mere complementary part thereof.

The particular things in time and space are all self-transcendent: each is heavy, i. e. is attracted to a body outside of it, and thus is a part of the unity formed by this relation. Earth and Moon and Sun make a system together, of which neither is independent. So, too, the Solar systems make a system, and this is a part of another system. The individual in space and time is what it is through its relation, and relation is a transcending of the individual. Since what it is, is through its relation, it is an embodied contradiction—it is its own negation. And hence what *is*, is

THE UNIVERSAL.

For if we analyze the content of this phenomenal relativity we shall discover two sides which belong to the same essence: *1st*, the deficiency, want or lack manifested in its relativity, is the activity of the including totality or "negative unity"; *2d*, itself is negative to its including totality, for it loses its separate independence if the latter has full sway. Both these factors are actively united in what is called a *phenomenon*. It would not be phenomenal, i. e. transient, unless the negative unity of the including total annulled the real and caused the potential to become real. (See Chap. VIII. again; also "*Essence and Phenomenon*" in Vol. I. Jour. Sp. Phil., p. 14.) Therefore in the activity which constitutes a phenomenon we have a manifestation of the including totality in its entire compass. Here we find the *GENERIC*. The Constant under the Variable is the *generic*, and *it*, we see, is the only true individual, for it alone abides and does not pass over into another, as the particular of space and time does continually. Hence words as expressing the *generic*, express the only actuality or the only *Being for itself*. That the Universal is that which preserves its identity, amid the changing and variable, is the principle which gives a basis to Realism as opposed to Nominalism. It is a strange spectacle to witness the very men who hold to the doctrine of the *Correlation of forces* take the position of Nominalists. They, in effect, say: All change or phenomenality is the play of forces which have no permanent individuality, for they are in perpetual transition,

one force never retaining for a single instant its own identity, but always in process of becoming another different force. From this it results that there is no individuality either in given material shapes—for these are dependent on the play of forces—nor in the given forces, *heat, electricity*, etc., for these are ceaselessly changing their forms. Hence the Correlationist must and *does* hold that the *generic* entity of force is the only abiding, and hence the only true individual. Stated in the terms we have been using in these chapters: The *negative unity*, which is only one of the moments of the comprehension (see Chap. VII.), is named *force*, and the Correlationist does not rise to the standpoint of *IDEA*, and hence does not get beyond an abstract Pantheism, wherein all finite existence suffers birth and decay, and even intelligence is regarded as a finite when brought before this abstract Force. What he omits to consider is the fact that such abstract force, when thus elevated to the Universal, is necessarily spontaneous, i. e. self-determining or self-originating. For if force moves to restore the destroyed equilibrium of a given entire system—and no other concept of it will suffice—then, to have a continual or abiding force, we must have a continual destruction of that equilibrium. This restoring and destroying of an equilibrium is the realization of the pure potentiality and the return to the same, and is the Universal in its actuality as *Ego*, or the *Generic*, which is the root of consciousness.

When the "Positivists," and all others in that stage of knowing which deals with *THE RELATIVE*, come to perceive this other side and ascend to its comprehension, they will have attained the *nopeu* of Aristotle and Hegel, and become Theistic.

INSTITUTIONS OF SPIRIT.

The embodied realization of the Universal or *GENERIC*, in its immediate form, is the *Ego*, as above intimated. But its embodiment in the individual has this difficulty: that the *Ego* is not completely possessed of itself until it frees itself from Nature, i. e. from the senses and from the reflective intellect. Its means of retaining itself as universal while in these lower stages are the *INSTITUTIONS OF SPIRIT*. Among the lowest forms of these is *fashion*—the commonness of humanity indicated by the prevailing fashion, and the difference thereof, indica-

ted by the same. Then habits and customs, moral and ethical, constitute a deeper community of spirit. The FAMILY, next after the individual, is his first realization of the *universal*. In the family the *tension of sex*, wherein the highest stage of Nature is reached, is cancelled. Nature never gets beyond this *tension of opposites* in any individual form; when we come to consciousness only, do we find a series of stages wherein this tension is solved and the two sides collapse into one-ness, just as the Ego knows itself, and this act is its fundamental characteristic. Man as *animal* is male and female, but as spirit he is his own object, and therefore celebrates this fact in the first institution of spirit—marriage, wherein he lays the basis of all culture and civilization. The individual longing, i. e. desire, which makes it a finite and dependent being is here annulled by being joined to the object of its desire, which object again reflects back the same dependence upon the first. Thus instead of a simple finite existence commencing with a given individual and ceasing with the same, we have by means of the family a realized universality, which receives the individual at birth and cares for him, and also lives on beyond him, and performs the last offices for him.

In CIVIL SOCIETY we have a higher realization of universality, wherein each man, through division of labor, is enabled to concentrate all his faculties on a speciality, and yet be sure of a supply of all the other specialities from the other individuals engaged like himself, only on different specialities; so that it is the whole *community*, only, that furnishes the complete outfit for each individual, and hence it acts as one organism, and each individual, through this act of transcending himself and making himself *for* all, receives in turn the service of all; and thus all are for him, and he is *for himself* through the reciprocal relation thus established. Hence civil society is an organism which serves the purpose of making Man universal in so far as the life in time and space is concerned; it makes all for and through each, and each for and through all. The relation begins from the individual and goes out to the many, but returns through them back to the individual.

Property is a realized universality of the individual will—nature transformed into a spiritual somewhat by being forced into the service of the spiritual. Again, property has

a universal solvent—*money*,—wherein all property becomes fluid and transferable, thus making it completely the instrument of Society. Thus each is made free and self-dependent; for in so far as he energizes and relates himself to the community, just so far does the community relate itself back to him, and he gets the fruit of his own deed.

But civil society is not thus complete as an instrument of realization of the universal without an obverse side—THE STATE. It is the State which holds the wheels of civil society in their places and renders all permanent and secure. Were there only positive or useful deeds—productive deeds—possible from the individual, then government would not be necessary, for civil society could go on by itself. But in that case, moreover, the institutions of spirit would not be for the genesis and nurture of spirit, for that presupposes rudimentary or germ forms of spirit wherein the complete consciousness has not yet been reached. Institutions are to take the undeveloped individual (whether infant or criminal) and guide him to self-guidance (i. e. negate his negativity). But no self-determination can begin without negating its own determinations, and hence its first acts must be *evil*; for its own determinations, those of nature, and of the moral organization in which it exists, are in and for themselves right. But it—the individual will—has the right to be self-determined, and hence to cancel these limits as imposed upon it from without, through education, etc. But the first acts of the will are mere “self-will” and the opposite of the rational will, and *must necessarily be so*. Hence the State is absolutely indispensable as the highest institution of spirit (so long, at least, as the state of childhood exists), and its functions are obviously these: it makes the individual's deed his own, whether positive or negative. If he negates the rational organism of civil society or the family, the state interposes and adds the link which brings his deed home to him, and he finds himself negating himself and suffering the consequences. Thus he learns to will rational deeds, i. e. deeds which have a universal content, and will not hurt the doer when they come back to him. The doer is made universal by the state in the fact, that whatever the doer does, he does to himself, and is a complete circle. The state protects each from all and all from each, and each

from himself, by this function it exercises of universalizing each deed: the individual reaping the result of his own deed from the beginning, finds that evil deeds negate his power of doing at all. By the mediation of the prison and the gallows, his deed, if evil, hurts him alone and saves every other individual of the community from injury. By the completeness of the mediation each deed recoils soon enough to prevent an accumulation great enough to annihilate the individual by its return stroke. This function of universalizing man as free-doer (which belongs to the state) is not an exceptional one, but the very means by which all arrive at a rational will—a will that does not forever contradict itself, as caprice does. If now and then a man grows up uncorrected and murders or steals, it is evidence of the imperfection of the realization of the universalizing power, but it is also a warning example of what we *all* should be, were there *no* state.

While the state stands for the highest realization of the universal on the practical side, there are spheres above it in which this is achieved in a far more adequate manner. In Art there is a subordination of the natural into the rank of a mere symbol for spirit. In this, spirit realizes its universality in being able to remove all alien *appearance to the senses*.

In Religion spirit recognizes its unity with the supersensuous essence that it has attained to by thought. It places the Universal before itself as its ideal.

In Philosophy, spirit, the Universal is to be reached as the form of Speculative Insight, and this is the highest form of spirit. (*Ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἀριστον.*)

Thus Art symbolizes the Universal in material forms; Religion makes it an object of conception, while Philosophy comprehends it concretely.

CONCLUSION.

With the consideration of the Universal our Introduction may conclude. If any one seizes the Universal as we have attempted to characterize it here, he will have seized the key to all thinking and Being, and will be prepared to accompany us through a consideration of the different systems of Philosophy that have prevailed and now prevail.

But this series would not be complete without giving a hasty review of our pro-

gress from Chapter I. to Chapter X., and showing that each *aperçu* was a phase of the Universal, and luminous for that very reason. We may sum up, therefore, our results as follows:

CHAPTER I.

Time and Space are *a priori*, and yet the logical conditions of the world; hence Mind, which is the source of what is *a priori* (and hence, for the reason mentioned, is the logical condition of the world in Time and Space), must be the Universal and a solvent of all that exists.

CHAPTER II.

The Finite and Infinite distinguished: the Finite, "that which is limited by something other than itself;" and the Infinite, that which is its own "other" or limit, and hence, instead of *limiting* itself, *continues* itself, and is thus universal.

CHAPTER III.

Categories, or general predicates, are the means by which we cognize, and as instruments must be presupposed by all knowing. Thus generalized, we must find a primitive category at the root or starting-point of our Knowing; and this is the category of Being. This category is the simple act of the mind in judgments—the "is"-ing—and hence we see that the primitive category is the Ego itself in its simplest form posited objectively, and hence the fundamental act of knowing is an act of distinguishing the self and identifying it with the self. All further knowing is the same process repeated, and hence it is the realization of the Universality of the Ego as intelligence. The Ego can have no other than itself as object for it.

CHAPTER IV.

Being is dependent or independent—determined through itself or through another.—In all cases, dependent Being or Being through another, is a *moment* (or complementary element) of a complex whole which is, as such, independent and self-determined.—Hence the Self-determined is the Basis of all Being, and it is hence the Universal or all-present form. Besides, since it is *self-determined* it is spontaneous and originating, creative of the special and destructive of the same. It is thus *Generic*.

This is the most easy ascent to the foun-

tain-idea of Speculative Philosophy that I know of. It is the most elementary form of the *conscious* apprehensions of the Universal. It is the key to all great *aperçus* of Speculative Philosophy, and should be seized fully by the one who wishes to make anything out of the works of Genius.

The self-determined, if seized more clearly, proves to be dual—subject and object—and a unity constituting the individual. From which, if carefully considered, there follows conscious personality as the Supreme principle of the Universe; this and all other spiritual truths ray out from this great central point of speculation.

CHAPTER V.

"Necessity and Chance" lead us to consider the subject of determination more fully.* An example of the *dialectic* is af-

* The doctrine of the Universal is the cure for that form of fatalism now current in literature as a species of "Positivism." An example in point will be found in the "Atlantic Monthly" for September, 1888, entitled "The Impossibility of Chance," wherein the externality of all determination is insisted upon to the exclusion of all spontaneity. It requires only the tracing out of the train of thought there started, to its ultimate consequences, to see how unwarrantable are the inferences ther. drawn:

Facts are not absolute, individual, and definite existences; they are relative syntheses. The shallowest thinker seizes the merest unessential phase as the "fact" for him. The deeper the thinker, the wider and more comprehensive the synthesis included in his "fact." Newton thought the whole celestial mechanism in the fact of the fall of an apple. It depends on how far back one traces the causes, or how widely the "totality of conditions"; for each fact implies the whole Universe as the totality of its conditions. But this doctrine frees us completely from the tyranny of *immediate sensuous* facts for it is evident that what the senses can perceive of a fact is a very small portion of the immense orbit which it fills. The "Negative Unity" which is arrived at by this degree of reflection is elevated above the *things* of sense, and can be apprehended only by thought.

But, in order to reach the Universal, one step more is requisite. The totality of conditions must be posited by itself since it has no externality conditioning it again. If we now inquire for the source of the determinations which arise in it, we have no resource but to acknowledge their spontaneity. Reflection is here "cornered," for it cannot go outside of the "All." If externality of conditioning rests ultimately on self-determination, the latter must be set up as the supreme principle and the former as a derivative one, or one that forms a mere phase of the latter. Hence "the impossibility of necessity" would be as rational a title as the one above alluded to. Chance is to be applied to the immediate form of spontaneity, and Necessity is the mediate form of the same, while Freedom is the same in its entirety.

forded in the treatment given in this chapter. Assuming, first, the standpoint of fatalism—all is determined from without by external causes—we see if this is thought as universal, that the all or Total must be without (or outside of) itself, and thus, at all events, self-determined. Hence Necessity must presuppose self-determination, and can apply only to the part and not to the whole or totality, which is universal and free.

CHAPTER VI.

A more general form of treating the same subject (i. e. determination) is given in the chapter on Mediation.

The Immediate—that which is out of relation; the Mediate, that which is only in relation. Made Universal, we have Absolute Mediation—Self-relation—Self-determination, or the Universal again.

(a) The Immediate cannot be a determined somewhat, and is naught; (b) the Mediate is determined, and thus dependent or finite; (c) the Absolute Mediate is the self-relation, which is the Independent and True.

N. B.—The True and Universal is not a stuff, or material, or thing, or rigid substance; but is a relation to itself which can subsist only in activity, or in a process. Hence the Universal is not a simple Immediate nor a simple Mediate, but both in one, and the Active is the permanent substance.* The Universal, moreover, as a multiplicity in unity, is a system, an *organic* whole.

CHAPTER VII.

We now trace further the insight into the nature of the Universal as a system. As *comprehension* it is the "negative unity" together with the "moments," and this is not the Absolute Universal which the Idea is. It must be not merely a totality, but a totality of totalities, in order to be the Idea,† which is the highest thought of Philosophy. In this connection, the doctrine of pure Theism, in contradistinction to Pantheism or Atheism, gets established.

* The Active is the ground of all Being. This doctrine distinguishes all Speculative Philosophy from its opposite. Plato, Aristotle, Heraclitus, Proclus, Plotinus, Hegel, Leibnitz, and others, hold this doctrine in some one of its various forms.

This is one of the first points for the student of Philosophy to direct his attention to. Until he can see *in his own way* this important doctrine, he can have at best only a historical knowledge of the various systems, and they will pass for mere opinions.

† Idea is used in this sense by Hegel alone.

All mere limitation from without vanishes in the sphere of the Idea, and instead of it we find *Recognition* as its form of relation to the "other-being."

CHAPTER VIII.

In the "Idea" we found the true system which the Universal is, as the Absolute Mediation; in this chapter we have the Universal as the Actual. The moments of the Actual are *reality* and *potentiality*—a process of reciprocal action wherein the total is involved, and in which it maintains itself as absolute mediation or self-determination, or as the Universal. The "Form of Eternity" is the world's essence and actuality. The Phenomenal, seen from this standpoint, is an exhibition of the validity of the Eternal which abides in the activity (the "wrath of the wicked" turned into "praise," and all finitude in a state of being annulled by its own imperfections). The Finite is thus only a field for the display of the Idea.

CHAPTER IX.

Finally, we approach the Universal from the standpoint of Pure Thought, and consider the question of *distinction* and *identity* in the most general form. Here again, as in Chapter V., we have an example of the dialectic.* The method which distinguishes

But it signifies the standpoint of Aristotle, and it is the speculative basis of the Christian Theology, especially as relating to the dogma of the Trinity. Leibnitz founded his Monadology on that *opercu*. So, too, the national form of government of the United States is a realization of it. Recognition and Tolerance are the accompaniments of its realization.

* The ascent from the part to the whole is a

Pure Thought is this: it places the subject treated of, under the form of the Universal (the "form of Eternity") and considers the result. In such a crucible all baser metals give way and vanish, and leave the pure gold. To speak without metaphor: all categories when tried by this standard show their deficiency, or what they lack in order to give them independent Being. Thus *Identity*, if not simple immediateness or vacuity, is a self-relation, and involves distinction, and hence is Universal; self-distinction is thus the basis of identity. That negation of negation is the form of all Being or identity is here made manifest. This chapter may be called The Genesis of the Comprehension of the Universal.

CHAPTER X.

In the last chapter we recognize the soul of the method that has hovered before us in so many different shapes. The Universal is the creative source of principles, the solvent of all multiplicity, the criterion of truth, the abiding essence under the Phenomenal, the root of conscious identity. It is the Philosopher's stone, and by its alchemy the base dross of mere opinion may be converted into the pure gold of science.

dialectical process. A part taken as a whole shows its deficiencies as its presuppositions. It cannot be a part without presupposing the whole. But the dialectic is only a kind of ladder for the novice and for the preliminary stage of comprehension, and the speculative knowing uses the Idea, or the "knowing by wholes," as Thom is Taylor calls it. To see the necessary unity of independent totalities is the highest and most difficult step to attain; but the philosopher must not rest satisfied until he has attained this insight.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY.

II.—PERCEPTION.

(See page 150.)

In the previous chapter, our "voyage of discovery" had explored the shores of sensuous certitude for Truth; but no satisfactory result was arrived at within its domain, and we were forced to go out into a region of mediation, in our pursuit. It became evident that those who speak of immediate knowing, do not use the word "immediate" with any care as to its etymological signifi-

cation, for all knowing involves mediation—indeed, it is an act of mediating. Whether, on the one hand, it is the materialist, who holds that all our knowing is through the senses, and that we know best when we are sensuously intuiting, and that our knowledge becomes dimmer and dimmer by our removal from the object of the senses—or, on the other hand, it is the idealist, who holds that our only certain knowledge is immediate intuition *within*—inspiration, as it were—in either case, the same error ob-